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Abstract
Modern logicians have complained that Aristotelian logic lacks a distinction between predication (including negation) and 
assertion, and that predication, according to the Aristotelians, implies assertion. The present paper addresses the question of 
whether this criticism can be levelled against Aristotle’s logic. Based on a careful study of the De interpretatione, the paper 
shows that even if Aristotle defines what he calls simple assertion in terms of predication, he does not confound predication 
and assertion. That is because, first, he does not understand compound assertion in terms of predication, and secondly, he 
acknowledges non-assertive predicative thoughts that are truth-evaluable. Therefore, the implications of Aristotle’s ‘predica-
tion theory of assertion’ are not as devastating as the critics believe.
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1 Introduction
In the De interpretatione (Int.), Aristotle holds that affirma-
tion (κατάφασις) and denial (ἀπόφασις) constitute two dif-
ferent kinds of assertion (ἀπόφανσις) or assertive sentence 
(λόγος ἀποφαντικός). He conceptualizes the distinction in 
terms of combination (σύνθεσις) and separation, or division 
(διαίρεσις). In his view, affirming that Socrates is white, 
for example, requires combining being white with Socrates, 
whereas denying that he is white requires separating being 
white from him. The same distinction can be drawn in 
terms of two different kinds of belonging (ὑπάρχειν), or 
being predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι): attributive and nega-
tive. Affirming that Socrates is white implies predicating 
being white of him, whereas denying that he is white implies 
negating being white of him.
At first sight, this seems to be a reasonable way of distin-
guishing between affirmation and denial. A problem is, how-
ever, that Aristotle seems to be committed to the converse 
implications, too. He gives the impression that predicating 
being white of Socrates implies affirming that he is white, 
and that negating being white of him implies denying that he 
is white. It is not clear why he should make this assumption. 
Indeed, the assumption appears to be a confusion. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that some modern logicians such as Gottlob 
Frege have complained that Aristotelian logic lacks an ade-
quate distinction between predication (including negation) and 
assertion.1 Even if this criticism is not directly raised against 
Aristotle’s logic, there are good grounds to raise doubts about 
Aristotle’s position, too. It could be argued, for instance, that 
he is unable to differentiate the way in which we apprehend 
the predicative (i.e. propositional) contents of thought from 
the way in which we affirm or deny their truth. Furthermore, 
one might doubt whether Aristotle is able to differentiate the 
use of predication in a simple assertion from its uses in com-
pound assertions such as conditional and disjunctive asser-
tions. Hence, if the criticism is correct, Aristotle’s logic and 
thereby cognitive theory is laid on feeble grounds.
The question I shall address in this paper is whether the 
foregoing criticism is well grounded. The focus of my dis-
cussion will be on what Aristotle calls simple assertions, 
that is, assertions which signify one thing of one thing (Int. 
5, 17a15–16, 20–21). In the case of simple assertions, I 
argue, Aristotle fails to make a clear distinction between 
predication and assertion. That is, as seen above, because 
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he accounts for assertion in terms of predication. I shall 
refer to this account as the ‘predication theory of assertion’. 
However, it does not follow from this theory that Aristotle 
confounds predication and assertion. That is basically for 
two reasons. First, in the De interpretatione, Aristotle sets 
out to account for assertion or assertive sentence rather than 
predication, which is why one should be cautious in draw-
ing any conclusions about Aristotle’s view of predication 
in general. Note that Aristotle’s phrase for an assertive sen-
tence (λόγος ἀποφαντικός) suggests that he acknowledges a 
mere sentence (λόγος) that is not assertive. By the unquali-
fied term ‘sentence’ (λόγος), he has in mind primarily the 
kinds of modes of speech that are not truth-evaluable, such 
as prayer, but he does not rule out non-assertive sentences 
that are truth-evaluable.2 There are other contexts in which 
he examines predicative thoughts, such as deliberating 
(βουλεύεσθαι) and calculating (λογίζεσθαι), which may be 
true or false but do not obviously imply assertion or denial in 
all cases, for instance, when one is conducting research but 
has not yet reached a conclusion (e.g. Ethica Nicomachea 
6.9, 1142b1–2). Secondly, not even in the De interpretatione 
does Aristotle confound predication and assertion. As I shall 
show, the distinction between the two is obvious insofar as 
compound assertions are concerned. Even if Aristotle does 
not discuss compound assertions in any detail—for instance, 
he does not discuss the truth conditions for compound asser-
tions nor does he discuss the denials of compound asser-
tions—,3 he makes no suggestion that when we assert, say, 
‘Socrates teaches and Plato learns’, we also assert ‘Socrates 
teaches’ and ‘Plato learns’ separately. The conjunction in 
question involves two predications, but we only make one 
assertion. A conjunction may thus have unasserted parts.4 I 
assume that the same applies to other compound assertions 
such as the conditional ‘If Socrates teaches, Plato learns’.5 It 
follows that simple assertion and compound assertion consti-
tute different kinds of single assertions. Aristotle expresses 
this implication as follows: ‘A single assertive sentence is 
either one that reveals a single thing or one that is single in 
virtue of a connective’ (17a15–16; trans. Ackrill, modified).6
The foregoing considerations suggest that the implica-
tions of the predication theory of assertion are not as dev-
astating as the critics believe. As soon as we see the quali-
fications that Aristotle makes to this theory, the theory no 
longer looks outrightly false, and the criticism loses some 
of its power. The aim in this paper is thus twofold: on the 
one hand, I discuss the qualifications that Aristotle makes 
to the predication theory of assertion, and on the other, I 
consider whether and how we can address the criticism lev-
elled against that theory. The focus of this paper lies on the 
De interpretatione; other texts will be consulted only for the 
sake of comparison and contrast.7
2 For the contrast between assertion (ἀπόφανσις) and sentence 
(λόγος), see Int. 1, 16a2 and Int. 4, 17a2–4. However, Aristotle does 
not use the term λόγος in referring to sentences only; in some cases, 
the term refers to a phrase such as ‘a beautiful horse’ (Int. 2, 16a22). 
Furthermore, Aristotle does not consider the modern distinction 
between sentence and statement in cases such as ‘Socrates is white’ 
and ‘Sokrates ist weiß’, in which there are two different sentences, but 
only one statement.
3 See e.g. Geach (1972, pp. 15, 26). Geach gives a critical review of 
Aristotle’s considerations on conjunctions not only in the De inter-
pretatione, but also in some passages in the Sophistici elenchi and 
Analytica priora (APr.). In APr. 1.44, 50a40–b1, Aristotle prom-
ises to give an extensive account of arguments ‘from hypothesis’ (ἐξ 
ὑποθέσεως) elsewhere, but fails to do so. For Theophrastus’ work on 
this topic, see Barnes (1985).
4 This is an implication of what Geach (1972, pp. 13–14) takes to 
be a defining feature of what he calls ‘the classical doctrine of the 
conjunctive proposition’. Geach claims: ‘Like any other proposition, 
a conjunction may occur as an unasserted part, e.g. as an if or then 
clause, of a longer proposition’ (Geach’s emphasis). From the claim 
that any proposition may occur as an unasserted part of a longer prop-
osition, it follows that the propositions that constitute the conjunction 
may occur as unasserted parts. This is not to suggest that Aristotle 
would deny, for the reasons just given, the principle of conjunction 
5 In the case of the conditional, it is perhaps easier to see why the 
compound assertion does not imply assertion of each of its elements.
6 Here I follow the interpretation that is shared by all ancient com-
mentators (Ammonius In Int. 66.31–67.19; 73.15–74.14; Boethius In 
Int. sec. ed. 96.28–97.18; 105.1–18; 115.23–116.6; Stephanus In Int. 
20.4–10; 20.16–24; anon. In Int. 18.7–19). The same interpretation 
can be found in some medieval commentators (e.g. Thomas Aqui-
nas, Expositio libri Peryermenias I 8, 192–198, 261–277) as well as 
some modern interpreters, e.g. Crivelli (2004, p. 172), and Weide-
mann (2014, pp. 193–197). However, other modern commentators, 
e.g. Lukasiewicz (1954, pp. 131–132), and Bobzien (2002, p. 364), 
assume that Aristotle does not allow a single assertion to consist of 
sentences combined by connective particles. Presumably, they make 
this assumption because Aristotle overlooks compound assertions in 
his discussion of demonstration in the Analytics. However, this rea-
son is not convincing because the scope of the De interpretatione is 
broader than the theory of demonstration. For a very helpful note on 
further references, see Crivelli (2004, p. 172 n. 72).
7 Hence, I do not assume that Aristotle’s considerations in the De 
interpretatione are entirely in line with e.g. the Analytica priora. For 
a helpful recent account of assertion that is mainly based on the Ana-
lytica priora, see Crivelli (2012, pp. 113–124).
elimination, i.e. the inference from ‘p and q’ to ‘p’ (and to ‘q’). We 
do not know about his view of this inference or other similar infer-
ences based on a single premise, because he does not discuss such 
cases. The point that I wish to make is rather that it is one thing to 
assert ‘p and q’ and another thing to assert ‘p’ and ‘q’ separately, 
because the proposition ‘p and q’ is a single unit (as in ‘if p and q, 
then r’) that is different from the pair of separate propositions ‘p’ and 
‘q’.
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2  Truth and Falsity, Combination 
and Separation
In the beginning of the De interpretatione, Aristotle pro-
poses the following analogy between speech and thought:
Just as some thoughts in the soul are neither true nor 
false while some are necessarily one or the other, so 
also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to 
do with combination and separation. Thus names and 
verbs by themselves—for instance ‘man’ or ‘white’ 
when nothing further is added—are like the thoughts 
that are without combination and separation; for so far 
they are neither true nor false. (16a9–16)8
The proposal put forward here is that there are two kinds 
of locutions and thoughts: those that are either true or false, 
and those that are neither true nor false. This distinction 
between being a truth-bearer and not being a truth-bearer is 
fundamental. Thoughts and locutions that are not capable 
of being truth-bearers include thoughts and locutions about 
single items such as man, being white or a two-footed ani-
mal. Such thoughts are concepts which correspond to single 
terms or expressions in a language. Even if they are constitu-
ents of true and false thoughts and locutions, they do not in 
and of themselves constitute affirmations and denials, the 
topic of the present paper. In what follows, therefore, the 
focus will be on the kind of locutions and thoughts that can 
be truth-bearers and hence are truth-evaluable.
Aristotle claims that being true or false involves some 
sort of combination (σύνθεσις) or separation (διαίρεσις). He 
does not specify what he means by ‘combination’ and ‘sepa-
ration’ here, but the context suggests the following. In the 
case of speech, what we combine and separate are typically 
names and verbs. For instance, when we combine ‘being 
white’ with ‘Socrates’, we say, ‘Socrates is white’, which 
is either true or false depending on whether Socrates is in 
fact white or not. Similarly, when we separate ‘being white’ 
from ‘Socrates’ by using a negation, we say, ‘Socrates is not 
white’, which is either true or false depending on whether 
Socrates is in fact white or not.
In the present context, Aristotle does not explain how the 
proposed analogy with thoughts (νοήματα) works, but we 
can begin with the following suggestion. When we com-
bine the concept of being white with the mental correlate 
of the name ‘Socrates’, we think that Socrates is white. By 
analogy, when we separate the concept of being white from 
the notion of Socrates, we think that Socrates is not white. 
The composite thoughts involved are either true or false 
depending on whether Socrates is in fact white or not.
The claim that being true and false implies some sort 
of combination originates from Plato’s Sophist. There the 
Eleatic Visitor suggests that the most basic statement arises 
from a combination (συμπλοκή) of a noun (ὄνομα) and a 
verb (ῥῆμα). For example, when one combines the noun 
‘man’ with the verb ‘learns’, one produces the statement 
‘Man learns’ (262c9). A further example Plato gives is the 
statement ‘Theaetetus sits’ (263a2). The two examples sug-
gest that in Plato’s view, the noun may be a proper name or 
a common noun.
How do Aristotle’s considerations relate to Plato’s? Aris-
totle generalizes Plato’s point about the combination of a 
noun and a verb. In Aristotle’s view, simple assertion may 
consist not only of a noun and a verb but also of a noun 
and a verbal phrase such as ‘is just’. In Int. 10, 19b24–25, 
he points out that the word ‘is’ (ἐστιν) is construed with 
the predicate term rather than with both the subject and the 
predicate terms (as is the case in the Analytics in which Aris-
totle takes the word ‘is’ to be a copula, and therefore rejects 
the syntax of the Sophist). Although there is some evidence 
to the contrary (e.g. 19b19–22; 21b27–28, which point in 
the direction of the Analytics), it is reasonable to suppose 
that in the De interpretatione Aristotle is advancing Plato’s 
analysis of simple assertion.9 Additionally, he makes fur-
ther divisions between the different kinds of assertion. Apart 
from affirmative and negative assertions, he distinguishes 
between simple and compound assertions, between singular 
and general (either universal or particular) assertions, and 
between categorical, apodictic and problematic assertions. 
In what follows, the focus will be on the distinction between 
affirmative and negative assertions on the one hand, and sim-
ple and compound assertions on the other.
The claim that being true and false implies combination 
and separation sets Aristotle’s view of truth-bearers apart 
from some later developments. Whilst Aristotle takes the 
bearers of truth-values to be linguistic, mental or even mind-
independent composite entities, that is, locutions, thoughts 
or Socrates being white (or the fact that Socrates is white), 
for example, many of his critics, such as the early Stoics 
and Frege, claim them to be exclusively mind-independent 
propositions.10
8 All the translations of the Int. are from Ackrill (1963); all other 
translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
9 For more detailed considerations in support of this interpretation, 
see Barnes (1996, pp. 187–192).
10 I am referring to Frege (1918). For the Stoics, see e.g. Diogenes 
Laertius 7.65 and Sextus Empiricus Adversus mathematicos 8.74. I 
say ‘even mind-independent composite entities’ because it is contro-
versial whether Aristotle, in Metaph. Δ.29, 1024b17–21, and Θ.10, 
1051b1–3, attributes truth and falsity to the composite objects of 
thoughts and locutions. For a positive answer to this question, see 
e.g. Crivelli (2004, pp. 46–62); for a negative, see e.g. Charles and 
Peramatzis (2016). This issue is significant because in Metaph. Ε.4 
Aristotle says in contrast that ‘falsity and truth are not in objects […] 
but in thought’ (1027b28–29). However, nothing of importance for 
the present paper depends on adjudicating this issue.
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Aristotle thus claims that true and false locutions and 
thoughts imply a requisite sort of combination or separa-
tion. He contrasts such locutions and thoughts with those 
that are neither true nor false (16a13–16). The implication 
is that such locutions and thoughts are neither true nor false 
because they do not arise from a relevant sort of combina-
tion or separation. It is reasonable to assume that the locu-
tions and thoughts in question include those that entirely 
lack combination and separation because they consist of 
single concepts and terms that are constituents of combina-
tion and separation. These are the cases that Aristotle pays 
most attention to. However, he also acknowledges locutions 
and thoughts that involve a different, non-assertive sort of 
combination or separation, namely questions, commands, 
prayers and the like (Int. 4, 17a2–7). In his view, then, it is 
only a certain kind of combination or separation that gives 
rise to true and false locutions and thoughts.11
The foregoing considerations have shown that all true 
and false locutions and thoughts involve a specific kind of 
combination or separation. But nothing said thus far sug-
gests that all true or false locutions and thoughts imply an 
affirmation or denial. This is a controversial implication. In 
what follows, I shall argue that Aristotle is not committed to 
that implication without qualification. I have already men-
tioned that in some contexts outside the De interpretatione, 
for instance, when discussing the nature of research and 
deliberation, Aristotle acknowledges non-assertive locu-
tions and thoughts. However, there is some evidence that he 
distinguishes between predication and assertion even in the 
De interpretatione. Even if he fails to make a clear distinc-
tion between the two in the case of simple (i.e. categorical) 
assertions, he separates them in the case of compound (i.e. 
hypothetical) assertions.
3  Simple and Compound Assertions
In Int. 4 Aristotle claims, ‘A sentence is a significant spo-
ken sound some part of which is significant in separation—
as an expression, not as an affirmation’ (16b26–28; trans. 
Ackrill). Here he contrasts a sentence (λόγος) with its part 
that remains a significant expression (φάσις) even when it is 
removed from the sentence.12 For instance, ‘an animal’ sig-
nifies an animal even when it is separated from a sentence, 
but it constitutes neither the affirmation ‘An animal exists’, 
nor the denial ‘An animal does not exist’, for example, unless 
it is combined with the predicate. By adding ‘as an expres-
sion, not as an affirmation’, he points out that an expression 
that is part of a sentence does not constitute in separation 
an affirmation or, for that matter, a denial. This suggests 
that Aristotle is characterizing here a simple sentence rather 
than a compound sentence, parts of which constitute affir-
mations or denials in separation. Consider, for example, the 
compound sentence ‘If Socrates teaches, Plato learns’. The 
expression ‘Socrates teaches’ constitutes an affirmation if 
it is taken out of the sentence. However, if it is part of the 
compound sentence, it does not constitute an affirmation. I 
shall suggest in a moment that Aristotle treats in this way all 
those assertions that are compounded by sentential connec-
tives such as ‘if’, ‘or’, and ‘and’. In other words, compound 
assertion, according to Aristotle, constitutes a single asser-
tion rather than several assertions.
In the present context, Aristotle focuses on assertive sen-
tences. He proceeds to explain what is distinctive of asser-
tive sentences, thus: ‘Every sentence is significant […] by 
convention but not every sentence is assertive, but only those 
in which there is truth or falsity’ (16b33–17a3; trans. modi-
fied). A straightforward interpretation of this claim is that if 
a sentence is true or false, it is assertive. In other words, all 
true or false sentences are assertions. The immediate context 
seems to support this interpretation: ‘There is not truth or 
falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence, but is neither 
true or false’ (17a3–4). The fact that Aristotle contrasts here 
true and false sentences with non-assertive sentences such 
as prayers that have no truth-value suggests that he takes all 
true and false sentences to be assertions.13 But this cannot 
11 In commenting on Int. 1, 16a9–18 (the passage quoted above in 
part), Ammonius points out this implication succinctly, thus: ‘So 
truth and falsity are wholly concerned with combination and divi-
sion, but not every combination or division accepts one or the other 
of these. In fact, one who wishes or uses any other sentence besides 
the assertoric combines names and verbs while saying nothing either 
true or false. But the combination or division must be of the “belong-
ing” (ὑπαρκτική) type, that is, it must reveal that one item belongs or 
does not belong to another, a character seen only with regard to the 
assertoric sentence.’ (In Int. 27, 8–14; trans. Blank)
13 It is not entirely clear why Aristotle says that a prayer has no truth-
value. In Int. 9, 18a33–34, he claims that sentences about singular 
states of affairs in the future have no truth-value, and he may assume 
that prayers are among these sentences. I do not think, however, that 
this is the reason why he denies truth-value to a prayer. Since Aristo-
tle, in the passage cited above, gives prayer only as one example of a 
non-truth-evaluable sentence, I assume that he takes it to be analo-
gous with other similar sentences such as a wish or a command which 
are not expressed in the indicative mood that is confined to factual 
statements, i.e. assertions that are true or false. Instead, in Aristotle’s 
12 In the sentence quoted, then, Aristotle uses the term ‘expression’ 
(φάσις) in signifying a subsentential expression. That is why the 
contrast he draws here is between a subsentential expression and an 
affirmation, rather than between a sentence that is not affirmed and 
an affirmation. It is not entirely clear which of the two Aristotle has 
in mind in DA 3.7, 431a8–9, where he contrasts ‘saying’ (τὸ φάναι) 
with ‘affirming’ (καταφάναι) and ‘denying’ (ἀποφάναι). Elsewhere, 
he tends to use the term φάσις in signifying either an affirmation 
(e.g. Int. 12, 21b21–22; APr. 1.46, 51b20, 2.11, 62a14; Metaph. 
Γ.4, 1008a9), or more generally an assertion, including affirmation 
and denial (e.g. Int. 12, 21b19, 22a11; Metaph. Γ.6, 1011b14, Κ.5, 
1062a6).
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be correct. And that is not Aristotle’s view, or so I argue. For 
instance, the false sentence ‘The sun is a foot across’ does 
not constitute an assertion if a perceiver uses it to express in 
a predicative form what appears to her when she is looking 
at the sun, but does not in fact believe that the sun is a foot 
across. To give a plausible account of assertion, therefore, 
Aristotle ought to place some further requirements for a true 
or false sentence to count as assertive. And he does that, 
even if, as we shall see, he does not give a complete account 
of the matter in the De interpretatione.
In the subsequent two chapters, Aristotle specifies how he 
understands the nature of assertion. First, in Int. 5, he draws 
the distinction between an affirmative and negative assertion, 
thus: ‘The first single assertive sentence is the affirmation, 
next is the denial’ (17a8; trans. modified). Affirmation and 
denial are given here as different kinds of the single asser-
tive sentence (ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος).14 Aristotle continues 
by stating, ‘Every assertive sentence must contain a verb 
or an inflection of a verb’ (17a9; trans. modified). That is a 
syntactic requirement for being an assertive sentence. The 
contrast between ‘verb’ and ‘inflection of a verb’ is between 
the present tense and the other tenses. Even if some uni-
versal statements such as ‘All men are mortal’ constitute 
eternal and hence in a way timeless truths, they are neverthe-
less tensed in a semantic analysis.15 A couple of lines later, 
he adds two further, alternative requirements, which I have 
already quoted in the introduction of the present paper: ‘A 
single assertive sentence is either one that reveals a single 
thing or one that is single in virtue of a connective’ (17a15; 
trans. modified).16
The first requirement is semantic by nature. It requires 
that a single assertion reveals a single thing. I take this to 
mean that a single assertion signifies one thing about one 
thing. This point is confirmed in Int. 8. There Aristotle adds 
that a single assertion signifies one thing about one thing, 
‘whether about a universal taken universally or not’ (18a13). 
In his view, then, a universal assertion such as ‘All men are 
white’ constitutes just a single assertion, even if it implies 
that the predicate is affirmed of each man.17 Further, in Int. 
11, Aristotle puts forward considerations on how several 
predicates can constitute a compound predicate that signi-
fies one thing rather than several things. More specifically, 
the question Aristotle discusses is under which conditions 
it is legitimate to infer from the claims that a is F and G the 
claim that a is FG, where FG signifies one thing (20b31–33). 
Aristotle notes, for instance, that it is not legitimate to infer 
from someone being good and a cobbler that he is a good 
cobbler (b35–36). That is presumably because the person in 
question may not be good insofar as he is a cobbler. He may, 
for example, be a good father, but a poor cobbler. In this 
case, then, the attribute ‘good’ does not qualify the attribute 
‘cobbler’; it rather qualifies directly the person who hap-
pens to be a cobbler. Hence, even if it is correct to say that 
the cobbler is good, that is true only because the person 
who happens to be a cobbler is good. In other words, the 
cobbler is good merely accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός, 
21a8).18 Further examples clarify the matter. It is incorrect 
to infer from someone being educated and white that he is an 
educated white (a9–14). The compound predicate ‘educated 
white’ fails to single out one thing, because ‘educated’ does 
not specify ‘white’; it merely qualifies the subject, a man. 
Hence, even if it is correct to say that the educated man 
is white, that is true only because the man who happens 
to be educated is white. In other words, the educated man 
14 The fact that Aristotle mentions affirmation first gave rise to an 
issue on the status of an assertive sentence in the commentary tradi-
tion. Alexander of Aphrodisias, it is told, argued that if affirmation 
is prior to denial then the two cannot be species of the same genus. 
Ammonius and Boethius rejected Alexander’s argument. For their 
criticism of Alexander, see Ammonius In Int. 67, 30–68, 9; Boethius 
In Int. sec. ed. 98, 15–99, 12.
15 Consider, for instance, ‘The simple statement is a significant spo-
ken sound about whether something does or does not hold in one of 
the divisions of time’ (17a23–24). Ackrill puts the expression that I 
have italicized in brackets, but that is misleading because Aristotle 
wishes to underline here the point that simple assertions are basically 
tensed assertions.
16 Substantially the same two requirements are put forward in De 
arte poetica 20, 1457a28–30 and APo. 2.10, 93b35–37. For a discus-
sion, see Barnes (2007, pp. 178–180).
17 In APo. 1.1, Aristotle further specifies the matter, thus: ‘We speak 
of “being predicated of all” when nothing can be found of the subject 
of which the other will not be said, and the same account holds for 
“of none”’ (24b29–30; trans. Striker). An implication of this specifi-
cation is that universal affirmation does not constitute a simple asser-
tion, but rather a compound assertion. So even if Aristotle considers 
universal affirmation to be single, he does not regard it as simple in a 
semantic analysis. I shall discuss this matter in more detail in Sect. 4.
18 For a similar use of the term ‘accidentally’ (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), 
see e.g. Cat. 6, 5a38–b10; APo. 1.22, 83a1–21; DA 2.6, 418a20–23. 
This usage is to be contrasted with the way in which a non-essential 
property (i.e. accident, τὸ συμβεβηκός) is said to belong to a sub-
stance, e.g. the property of being white to a man. For this use, see e.g. 
Metaph. Γ.4, 1007a31–34; APo. 1.4, 73a34–b5. Weidemann (2014, p. 
381), notes correctly that in Metaph. Δ.7, 1017a7–22, Aristotle uses 
the term κατὰ συμβεβηκός in a broader sense that comprises the two 
usages just mentioned.
Greek, the act of wishing is expressed in the subjunctive mood, and 
the act of command in the imperative mood. I am thus suggesting that 
in contrasting prayers with truth-evaluable sentences, Aristotle fol-
lows colloquial speech in which the distinction between factual and 
non-factual sentences is drawn in terms of the indicative mood and 




is white merely accidentally. By contrast, it is correct to 
infer from something being two-footed and an animal that 
it is a two-footed animal (20b33–34). That is because the 
predicate ‘two-footed’ specifies ‘animal’, and thereby the 
compound predicate ‘two-footed animal’ signifies one thing. 
These considerations suggest the following generalization: 
if the elements of the compound predicate determine each 
other, the predicate signifies a unity; if the elements do not 
determine each other, but do determine the subject directly, 
the predicate does not signify a unity. In the latter case, the 
attributes are independent of each other and merely co-occur 
in the subject.19
An advantage of this interpretation is that it helps to 
explain why Aristotle, somewhat surprisingly, considers the 
predicate ‘white man’ to single out one feature of the sub-
ject (20b34–35). The explanation is that Aristotle takes the 
attribute ‘white’ to specify ‘man’ rather than the subject, say, 
Socrates. In the present case, then, he does not require that 
the one feature singled out by the predicate ‘white man’ be 
a natural kind, and yet he insists that that feature constitutes 
a unity.20 Being a white man is indeed one way of being as 
opposed to being a black man, for example.21 It can be con-
cluded that Aristotle contrasts single assertions with several 
assertions by contrasting predicates signifying unities with 
predicates signifying accidental compounds.
The second requirement is syntactic by nature. It requires 
that a single assertion constitutes a single thing in virtue of 
a connective. Aristotle does not determine the relationship 
between the two requirements. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that the assertions that are compounded by a con-
nective are assertions that satisfy the first requirement. If that 
were not the case, compound assertions would not be single 
in a fundamental sense, because their components would be 
analysable into more basic assertions.
In the second requirement, the term ‘connective’ is 
ambiguous. I take that to be intentional on Aristotle’s part. 
By that term, he refers not only to predicative connectives in 
cases such as ‘Man is two-footed and an animal’ and ‘Man 
is educated and white’, but also to sentential connectives in 
cases such as ‘Man is two-footed and man is an animal’ and 
‘Man is educated and man is white’. There is a connection 
between the two types of cases because the former assertions 
imply the latter ones. The point Aristotle wishes to make 
here is that not only a simple assertion but also a compound 
assertion constitutes a single assertion. That is why he con-
trasts these assertions with those that fail to be single. In the 
present case, the lack of a connective explains why there is 
more than one assertion in cases such as ‘Man is two-footed. 
Man is an animal’ and ‘Man is educated. Man is white’.
The two further requirements, as Ackrill correctly notes, 
seem to be inconsistent.22 It follows from the first require-
ment that ‘Man is an educated white’ does not count as a 
single assertion, whereas the second requirement treats the 
assertion ‘Man is educated and white’ as a single assertion. 
The inconsistency is merely apparent, however, because 
Aristotle understands the single assertion in the two cases 
in a different way, or so I argue. The argument, then, is that 
what it is to be a single assertion for a simple assertion is 
different from what it is to be a single assertion for a com-
pound assertion. In the first case, a single assertion consists 
of a certain kind of combination or separation, i.e. attribu-
tive or negative predication, whereas in the second case, it 
is achieved through a requisite connective. Since the two 
requirements imply a different understanding of single asser-
tion, there is no discrepancy between them. Note that Aristo-
tle needs both requirements because there must be some cri-
teria to decide whether any given assertion is single or not. 
The second requirement is particularly important. Unless he 
accepts it, he will be unable to give a satisfying account of 
compound assertions (i.e. hypothetical assertions) and thus 
address the issue I mentioned in the introduction. Before we 
can address that issue, we need to look closer at the distinc-
tion Aristotle makes between simple and compound asser-
tions. That helps to further clarify the basic distinction he 
draws between affirmation and denial.
As mentioned, Aristotle divides assertive sentences into 
simple and compound. He says, ‘Of these the one is a simple 
assertion, affirming or denying something of something, the 
other is compounded of those [simple assertions] and is a 
kind of composite assertion’ (17a20–22; trans. modified). 
Now the way in which Aristotle characterizes simple asser-
tion sheds further light on his understanding of the nature 
19 I take this generalization to be Aristotle’s answer to the ques-
tion of what the difference is between the two types of compound 
predicates, i.e. those that signify a unity and those that do not 
(20b31–33). By giving this answer, Aristotle does not give a general 
rule to decide whether an element of a given compound predicate 
determines another element or not. Hence, Aristotle does not explain 
when it is legitimate to pass from separate predicates to a compound 
predicate. That is why I agree with Ackrill (1963, p. 148), who con-
cludes his commentary of the passage in question by saying that ‘no 
general rule has been given as to which predicates function, when 
combined with others, as “good” does in “good cobbler”’. For fur-
ther considerations in support of this interpretation, see Weidemann 
(2014, pp. 385–387).
20 Here, again, I am following Ackrill (1963, p. 147), who notes, cor-
rectly, ‘Yet “white man” is an excellent example of what is not a real 
or natural unity like “two-footed animal”’ (Ackrill’s emphasis).
21 In the beginning of Int. 11, however, Aristotle denies that the 
attributes ‘white’, ‘man’ and ‘walking’ succeed in signifying a unity 
(20b18–19). It is not entirely clear how this denial is to be interpreted 
in the light of the subsequent considerations in the same chapter. It is 
reasonable to suppose, however, that Aristotle considers this case to 
be analogous with a man being white and educated (21a10). 22 See Ackrill (1963, pp. 126–127).
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of assertion. Here, he conceives of affirmation as a kind of 
predication rather than as the acceptance of a predicative 
sentence. He accounts for affirmation in terms of affirming 
something of something rather than in terms of affirming 
that something is the case, i.e. that S is P. That is because he 
assumes that affirmation consists in taking the predicate to 
be true of the subject, that is, combining the predicate with 
the subject in a distinctive way. Likewise, he accounts for 
denial in terms of denying something of something rather 
than in terms of denying that S is P. He thus assumes that 
denial consists in taking the predicate to be false of the sub-
ject, that is, separating the predicate from the subject in a 
relevant way. For these reasons, I find it appropriate to call 
Aristotle’s view of simple assertion a predication theory of 
assertion. However, I am not suggesting that he takes all 
kinds of predication to imply assertion. I shall return to this 
matter in a moment. I shall also return to his view of com-
pound assertion to explain why he does not take the elements 
of compound assertion to be assertions in their own right.
It should be clear from the foregoing considerations that 
Aristotle’s predication theory can be contrasted with, for 
example, the Stoic and Fregean theories in which assertion 
takes as its object a complete proposition.23 However, the 
foregoing considerations do not imply that Aristotle con-
siders it illegitimate to use propositional phrases such as 
‘I affirm that S is P’ or ‘I deny that S is P’ in referring to 
assertions. The point is just that he does not regard these 
formulations as being logically basic. They can be reduced 
to assertions with a predicative structure.
I will conclude this section by pointing out two implica-
tions of Aristotle’s considerations about simple assertion. 
First, from the assumption that denial consists in separating 
the predicate from the subject, it follows that the correct 
logical form of denial is ‘S is not P’ rather than ‘It is not the 
case that S is P’.24 That is so even if Aristotle is in the habit 
of formulating denials by prefixing the negative particle to 
the entire sentence.25 Secondly, from the assumption that 
all simple assertions are either affirmations or denials in the 
proposed way, it follows that also simple existential asser-
tions ought to be accounted for in predicative terms. It is 
not entirely clear, however, whether Aristotle succeeds in 
explaining existential assertions in predicative terms (Int. 
10, 19b14–19). It is beyond the scope of the present paper 
to review the merits of Aristotle’s theory in this respect. Let 
it suffice to say that at the very least, he has resources to 
address the issue, if not to settle it. As Crivelli has pointed 
out, Aristotle can qualify the way in which we affirm (or 
deny) Socrates to exist, saying, for example, that this con-
sists in affirming (or denying) his form to be combined with 
matter.26 Let me note a further obscurity in Aristotle’s con-
siderations. It is not clear whether affirmation and denial, 
considered from a cognitive point of view, require more than 
an act of predication. In other words, it is not clear whether 
an act of predication suffices to constitute an affirmation or 
a denial. Aristotle does not discuss this question in the De 
interpretatione. However, his discussion of compound asser-
tion suggests that predication is not sufficient for affirmation 
and denial. I shall proceed to discuss this matter next.
4  Further Consideration of Compound 
Assertions
The considerations put forward in the preceding two sec-
tions suggest that Aristotle has resources to address the criti-
cism levelled against the predication theory of assertion. By 
exploiting those resources, I hope to have shown that he 
does not fail to distinguish between predication and asser-
tion nor is he unable to differentiate the use of predication 
in a simple assertion from its use in a compound assertion. 
It is fair to admit, however, that Aristotle himself does not 
use those resources to address the criticism in any detail. In 
the De interpretatione, he does not discuss truth-evaluable 
sentences other than those that are assertive. Moreover, in 
one case he even seems to contradict himself when he sug-
gests, as seen above, that complex assertion is ‘compounded 
of those’ (ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένη), i.e. of simple assertions 
(17a21). However, this appears to be a single unhappy for-
mulation which is not repeated elsewhere. Therefore, it does 
not suffice to call into question the argument that I have 
pursued thus far.
Nonetheless, the argument proposed needs to be further 
clarified and examined. Let me first clarify the distinction 
23 For a testimony on the Stoic view, see Stobaeus Anthologium 2.88, 
4: ‘Acts of assent are directed to propositions’ (συγκαταθέσεις μὲν 
ἀξιώμασί τισιν). For an extensive discussion on Stoic propositions, 
see Frede (1974, pp. 32–44). Having shown that question and answer, 
i.e. assertion, contain the same proposition or thought (Gedanke), 
Frege (1918, p. 62) concludes by pointing out what is distinctive of 
assertion: ‘In einem Behauptungssatz ist also zweierlei zu unterschei-
den: der Inhalt, den er mit der entsprechenden Satzfrage gemein, hat 
und die Behauptung.’ He thus assumes that assertion consists in an 
assent to a proposition.
24 See e.g. Barnes (1986, p. 202), who discusses Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ view about the denials of singular affirmations. These 
denials are simple assertions. It does not follow that the general 
(quantified) denials, i.e. universal and particular denials, can be ana-
lysed in the same way. I shall suggest below (Sect. 4) that in a seman-
tic analysis, according to Aristotle, quantified assertions are com-
pound assertions, and that they require a sentential negation (‘It is not 
the case that…’). 25 See e.g. Int. 7, 17b10, 25, 28–29, 18a2–7; Int. 10, 19b32–35, 
20a5–7.
26 See Crivelli (2004, p. 124).
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between predication and assertion in the two cases under 
study: simple assertion and compound assertion. In sim-
ple assertion, as suggested, assertion is a certain kind of 
predication. In this case, then, we can regard the predica-
tion involved as being assertive. It does not follow that 
all predications are assertive, although Aristotle fails to 
emphasize this point in the case of simple assertion. In 
compound assertion, by contrast, predication and assertion 
are for obvious reasons different because, as seen, assert-
ing ‘If Socrates teaches, Plato learns’ does not imply assert-
ing ‘Socrates teaches’ and ‘Plato learns’, and yet it implies 
making two predications. In this case, then, the predications 
involved are to be regarded as being non-assertive, and yet 
capable of being true or false because they are combinations 
of terms. Even if Aristotle does not give an account of the 
different types of compound assertions, including conjunc-
tions and disjunctions, it is reasonable to assume that the 
same analysis applies to both of them.27 Further, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the compound assertion itself does 
not constitute a predication because it is not a combination 
or separation of terms. However, compound assertion is a 
combination or separation of sentences, and that is why it is 
an assertion that can be true or false.
Let me make a second clarifying remark about the distinc-
tion between affirmation and denial in simple and compound 
cases. In the simple case, Aristotle understands the distinction 
between affirmation and denial in terms of certain kinds of 
combination and separation, that is, affirmative and negative 
predication. In the compound case, however, a comparable 
account cannot be given, because compound assertions are 
not predications. Rather, as noted above, they are combinations 
and separations of sentences, compounded by relevant kinds of 
connectives. The question that we need to raise here is whether 
this characterization constitutes a reasonable account of com-
pound assertion. I shall address this question by considering 
two more specific questions: first, how Aristotle would account 
for negative compound assertions (i.e. compound denials), and 
second, how he would reduce those assertions that are pre-
sented in the form of a simple assertion but which are genuine 
compound assertions to compound assertions. Since Aristotle, 
as mentioned, does not give an account of compound asser-
tions, it would be pointless to try to answer these questions in a 
systematic manner. Therefore, I shall focus on some examples 
that help to point out the distinctive features of the approach 
to which Aristotle is committed.
Regarding the question about compound denials, consider 
the denial of ‘If Socrates teaches, Plato learns’. According to 
a reasonable modern understanding of the conditional (‘If p, 
q’), say, Frege’s understanding, the affirmation of the condi-
tional consists in affirming the truth of the inclusive disjunction 
between the negation of the antecedent and the consequent 
(‘not-p or q’), whereas the denial of the conditional consists in 
affirming the truth of the conjunction of the antecedent and the 
negation of the consequent (‘p and not-q’). In this understand-
ing, then, the denial of the given conditional implies affirming 
the conjunction ‘Socrates teaches and not: Plato learns’. As 
Frege insists, there is no need to postulate a distinct negative 
act of judgement because denial can be accounted for in terms 
of an affirmative act with a negated proposition. By contrast, 
Aristotle postulates an act of denial. The question that inter-
ests us for the present is whether he needs to refer to that act 
in explaining the denial of the conditional. The subsequent 
considerations suggest that he need not do so.
Suppose that Aristotle formulates the denial of the con-
ditional in question in terms of two predications with a con-
nective: ‘Socrates teaches and Plato does not learn’. The 
first predication is attributive, whereas the second is nega-
tive. Neither of the two is an assertion because they are ele-
ments of a compound assertion. Now, since the connective 
here is a conjunction that conjoins the two predications, it 
is reasonable to suggest by analogy with simple affirmation 
(which consists of a combination of the subject and predicate 
terms) that the assertion that we make here is an affirmation. 
Hence, the analysis suggests that Aristotle need not refer to 
the act of denial in explaining the denial of a conditional. 
However, a similar analysis suggests that he must refer to 
that act in explaining the affirmation of a conditional. That 
is because the affirmation in question is given in terms of the 
disjunction ‘Socrates does not teach or Plato learns’, and the 
disjunctive connective involved is most reasonably seen to 
separate the two predications. In this case, too, the sugges-
tion is based on the analogy with a simple denial, which con-
sists of a separation of the predicate term from the subject 
term. In the compound case in question, the denial consists 
of a separation of one predication from the other. The case 
is mixed in that one of those predications is negative and the 
other affirmative.
The foregoing considerations show that Aristotle has 
resources to account for both affirmation and denial of the 
conditional. I have assumed above that Aristotle would ana-
lyse the conditional ‘If…then…’ in terms of conjunction 
and disjunction, taking the two to correspond to affirmative 
and negative acts of judgement. If he found it unnecessary 
to posit other connectives beyond conjunction and disjunc-
tion, and if he took the double negation to be identical to 
27 In commenting on Int. 5, 17a15–17, Ammonius (In Int. 73.15–
74.14) denies that some conjunctions such as ‘Socrates sits and 
Alcibiades walks’ constitute a single (compound) affirmation. That 
is because, he says, the two predications are united only on account 
of expression; they do not signify a unity in reality. It is not entirely 
clear whether he takes all conjunctions to be of this type. However, he 
notes that the conditional ‘If god is good, the universe is eternal’, and 
the disjunctive ‘The universe is either eternal or created’ are single 
(compound) affirmations, and signify a unity. That is because the for-
mer signifies the consequence (ἀκολουθία) and the latter the disjunc-
tion (διάστασις).
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affirmation, he would have sufficient resources to account for 
all basic compound assertions. By ‘basic compound asser-
tions’, I refer to those compound assertions that include 
only one connective, either conjunction or disjunction, and 
hence are not mixtures of conjunctions and disjunctions, 
for example ‘(Socrates teaches and Plato does not learn) or 
Plato learns’. In analysing basic compound assertions, then, 
Aristotle applies four basic concepts: attributive predica-
tion, negative predication, affirmation and denial. Note that 
this is in fact less than what Frege posits in his analysis of 
compound assertions: proposition, negation, conjunction, 
disjunction, and affirmation. It does not follow, however, that 
Aristotle’s approach is simpler than Frege’s. That is because 
Aristotle is compelled to set the affirmations and denials in 
a hierarchy to analyse mixed compound assertions. In the 
above example, the affirmation indicated by the conjunc-
tive particle ‘and’ is subordinate to the denial indicated by 
the disjunctive ‘or’. That means that it loses its affirmative 
force in a way analogous to a predication embedded in a 
compound assertion. This is because a mixed compound 
assertion ought to constitute a single assertion rather than 
several assertions.
I then proceed to address the question of how Aristotle 
would reduce those assertions that are presented in the form 
of a simple assertion but which are compound assertions 
to compound assertions. Consider the universal denial ‘No 
man is white educated’.28 This denial looks like a simple 
denial, but it is not because of the complex predicate term. 
The denial cannot be reduced to the compound denial ‘No 
man is white and no man is educated’ because this denial 
and the original one do not mean the same. It does not fol-
low, however, that the original cannot be analysed into a 
compound assertion at all. On the contrary, such an analy-
sis can be given, or so I argue.29 In fact, a similar analysis 
can be given for all quantified assertions, whether they have 
complex predicates or not. Given that, the universal denial 
‘No man is white’ which is overtly a simple denial could be 
reduced to a complex one. For a deeper understanding of 
the matter, however, we need to make a brief digression to 
the Analytica priora. There Aristotle analyses the meaning 
of the quantified predications ‘being predicated of all’ and 
‘being predicated of some’ in compound terms. I suggest 
that he would be consistent in considering all quantified 
predications to be compound assertions in accordance with 
their semantic complexity.
In APr. 1.1, Aristotle concludes his discussion of predica-
tion, thus: ‘We speak of “being predicated of all” when noth-
ing can be found of the subject of which the other will not be 
said, and the same account holds for “of none”’ (24b29–30; 
trans. Striker). The fact that Aristotle characterizes not only 
universal denial but also universal affirmation in negative 
terms (‘nothing can be found’) is somewhat startling. How-
ever, his phrasing can be explained if we assume that he 
refers to an arbitrary individual, say z, of which a negative 
claim is made. In this interpretation, Aristotle’s conclusion 
yields the following characterizations of universal affirma-
tion (‘Every S is P’) and universal denial (‘No S is P’):
For every term S, for every term P, every S is P if and 
only if it is not the case that for some z, S is predicated 
of z and P is not predicated of z.
For every term S, for every term P, no S is P if and 
only if it is not the case that for some z, S is predicated 
of z and P is predicated of z.
In a semantic analysis, then, universal affirmation and 
universal denial are not simple assertions. Rather, they are 
compound assertions with two simple predications regarding 
some instance falling within the scope of the subject term. 
That is why they require an existential quantification (‘for 
some z’) with negation (‘it is not the case that…’). Even if 
Aristotle does not characterize ‘being predicated of some’ 
and ‘not being predicated of some’ in a similar fashion, we 
can propose the following formulations30:
For every term S, for every term P, some S is P if and 
only if for some z, S is predicated of z and P is predi-
cated of z.
For every term S, for every term P, some S is not P if 
and only if for some z, S is predicated of z and P is not 
predicated of z.
Now, applying the characterization of the universal denial 
given above, we can unpack the universal denial ‘No man is 
white educated’ in two steps. In the first step, we take apart 
the predications implied in the subject and predicate terms, 
treating the compound predicate ‘being white educated’ as 
if it were simple, thus: ‘It is not the case that for some indi-
vidual, he is man and he is white educated.’ In the second 
step, we analyse the compound predicate-term into two (i.e. 
‘being white and being educated’), and thus reach the com-
plete analysis: ‘It is not the case that for some individual, 
28 The expression ‘white educated’ is ambiguous, but the denial in 
question should be understood as saying, ‘No man who is white is 
educated’.
29 This is where I disagree with Weidemann (2014, p. 197), who 
notes, correctly, that the universal denial ‘No man is educated white’ 
cannot be analysed into ‘No man is white and no man is educated’. 
However, he is mistaken, along with Ackrill (1963, p. 126) and Geach 
(1972, p. 47), in his further remark that the denial in question can-
not be analysed into any other complex of simple claims either. That 
claim is true only of Aristotle’s considerations in the Int. However, as 
I argue below, Aristotle has resources to account for overtly simple 
quantified assertions in terms of compound assertions in the Analyt-
ica priora. 30 See Crivelli (2012, p. 119).
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he is a man and he is white and he is educated.’ A similar 
analysis can be given for the universal affirmation ‘Every 
man is white educated’, thus: ‘It is not the case that for some 
individual, he is a man and he is not white educated.’ Since 
‘is not white educated’ is identical to ‘is not white or is not 
educated’ (in which ‘or’ is understood inclusively), we reach 
the analysis ‘It is not the case that for some individual, he 
is a man and (he is not white or he is not educated)’. The 
foregoing considerations suggest that quantified assertions 
are not simple assertions in a semantic analysis. It can be 
concluded, then, that Aristotle can give a reasonable analysis 
of quantified assertions in terms of attributive predication, 
negative predication, affirmation (i.e. conjunction) and 
denial (i.e. disjunction), but he cannot reach a complete anal-
ysis without an existential quantifier (‘for some individual’, 
i.e. ‘there is an individual such that…’) with sentential nega-
tion (‘It is not the case that…’).
5  An Issue Regarding Indirect Proof
Having discussed the implications of Aristotle’s approach 
for his implicit view of compound assertions, I will proceed 
to examine whether the distinction between simple asser-
tion and compound assertion suffices to explain all kinds 
of demonstrations. Direct proof does not constitute a prob-
lem because the premises are by default assertions, either 
simple or compound. Indirect proof (reductio ad absurdum) 
requires closer examination, however. The issue is whether 
Aristotle can avoid suggesting that we affirm the false 
premise of an indirect proof, that is, the contradictory of the 
demonstrandum. He should avoid making that suggestion 
because we do not affirm that premise if we know that it is 
false. And that is the case when we apply the indirect proof, 
which Aristotle takes to be a specific kind of an argument 
‘from hypothesis’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, APr. 1.23, 41a25).
I argue that Aristotle can address the issue just raised. 
There are basically two alternative strategies, one inferior 
to the other. The first, the inferior one, is to suggest that in 
the case of indirect proof, Aristotle makes an exception to 
his principle that the premises of a demonstration are asser-
tions. The contradictory of the demonstrandum is taken to be 
a premise, a ‘hypothesis’, and yet it is not accepted as true. 
This is the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, for 
example (In APr. 256.18–25). There is a problem with this 
suggestion, however. The problem is that if the hypothesis 
is seen to be a premise of an ordinary syllogistic argument, 
it remains unclear why Aristotle aligns indirect proof with 
the other kinds of arguments from hypothesis that need not 
have simple assertions as premises. We need to turn to an 
alternative strategy, then.
A second strategy is to understand the false premise as 
part of a compound assertion.31 Now the entire compound 
assertion is taken to be the hypothesis Aristotle has in mind. 
This compound assertion can be taken as a general principle. 
Consider, for example, the following principle: ‘If something 
impossible follows from a given premise, then that premise 
is false.’ When we use this principle in deriving something 
impossible, we have shown that the denial of the premise can 
be asserted as true. It is reasonable to claim that this is what 
giving an indirect proof is all about. Further, and importantly 
for the present purposes, we can assert the principle with-
out asserting the false premise. In this line of interpretation, 
then, Aristotle can thwart the criticism that he could not give 
a reasonable account of indirect proof.
6  Belief and a Mere Thought
Having shown why Aristotle does not take predication to 
imply assertion in the case of compound assertions, I will 
return to consider why he is not committed to that implica-
tion in the case of simple assertions. Suppose that we do 
not know the answer to the question of whether the world 
is eternal or not (Topica 1.11, 104b16). There are different 
considerations for and against, and yet we lack sufficient 
grounds to make a decision. Given that, we can certainly 
understand the question without affirming or denying that 
the world is eternal. But why could not we simply say that 
the world is eternal, or that it is not eternal, without having 
any belief about its being eternal or not being eternal?
Of course we can, and Aristotle would not disagree. 
As it stands, however, he does not address this question in 
his logical treatises. That is because the question belongs 
to psychology or rhetoric rather than logic. Yet, Aristotle 
assumes that his logical theory is based on his psychologi-
cal theory. In Int. 1, he proposes a theory of signification, 
according to which written marks are symbols of spoken 
sounds, and spoken sounds symbols of the affections of the 
soul (16a3–8). He thus assumes that when we say that the 
world is eternal, that saying must correspond to some sort of 
an affection of the soul. If the affection in question is not a 
belief (δόξα) which comes with conviction (πίστις), it must 
be a mere thought. Let us consider these two alternatives in 
more detail.
In DA. 3.3, Aristotle characterizes belief as follows: 
‘Belief is accompanied by conviction, for it is not possible 
to have a belief unless we are convinced about what we 
believe in’ (428a19–22). This means that belief must be 
based on reasoning, or evidence of some kind, which pro-
duces conviction (πίστις). Typically, belief is based on 
31 For a recent defence of this interpretation, see e.g. Striker (2009, 
p. 177).
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other beliefs that lend support to the belief in question, and 
thereby make us convinced about what we believe in. Here, 
I assume, Aristotle follows Plato, who defines belief as the 
outcome of inner discussion (Sophist 264a1–b4). In some 
cases, however, belief can be based on mere thoughts, or 
how things appear to us. For example, when the sun appears 
to be a foot across, that is what we believe, unless some other 
belief contradicts that appearance, and makes us suspicious 
of the appearance.32 Note that the appearance in question 
is not necessarily accompanied by conviction. In fact, no 
appearance can be accompanied by conviction, except by 
incidence (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), because appearance pertains 
to the perceptual part of the soul. Aristotle says: ‘Conviction 
belongs to none of the brutes, whereas appearance belongs 
to many of them’ (428a19–22). That is because non-rational 
animals lack the intellectual capacity required for being 
convinced of anything. In fact, non-rational animals lack 
the intellectual capacity required for forming predicative 
thoughts in the first place; instead, they live by sense per-
ceptions, appearances and memories which are due to the 
perceptual capacity. By contrast, rational animals, i.e. human 
beings, have the capacity for forming predicative thoughts 
even when we are not convinced about the subject matter. 
We can have a mere thought about the world being eternal 
because we have the capacity to compare appearances, and 
make calculations before we acquire conviction about the 
object of study, and reach a conclusion.33
The suggestion that I am making here is this: when we 
say that the world is eternal, but we are not convinced about 
the matter, our saying corresponds to a mere thought. We 
entertain such a thought when we are conducting research 
on the matter, which implies that we measure the world by 
some conceptual standard such as a year as a unit of time.34 
When the research is complete, we draw the conclusion 
which means that we assert being eternal of the world, either 
affirmatively or negatively.
The foregoing considerations suggest that Aristotle has 
resources to explain the difference between asserting and 
mere saying. If the considerations are correct, Aristotle 
relates asserting to cases in which we are convinced about 
something. This is the case with the results of study. Mere 
saying, by contrast, is related to ongoing research (though 
not exclusively), that is, measuring an object of study when 
we have not yet reached a conclusion, and formulated it as 
an assertion. That is why mere sayings do not play a part in 
demonstrations.
It is worth emphasizing that only rational animals which 
are capable of using language, and associating and disso-
ciating things, can conduct research and acquire convic-
tion. Indeed, conducting research and acquiring conviction 
requires that we go beyond what we can perceive by the 
senses, and retain by memory. It requires cooperation of the 
perceptual capacity and the intellectual capacity, not only 
in discriminating the perceptible and intelligible features of 
objects, but also in passing judgements on them. This is 
not to say that Aristotle would limit mere saying to con-
ducting research. There are of course many other spheres of 
life, such as art and theatre, in which we express ourselves 
and imagine things without forming beliefs and making 
assertions. That is the reason why we are not necessarily 
affected when we look at pictures of frightening things in 
an art gallery. However, when we believe that something is 
32 In De insomniis 2, Aristotle explains how we can be deceived by 
the reports of our senses as follows: ‘The reason why these things 
happen is that the authoritative capacity and the capacity by which 
phantasms occur do not judge with the same power. An indication of 
this is that the sun appears to be a foot across, and yet often some-
thing else contradicts that appearance’ (460b16–20). Aristotle thus 
suggests that when there is nothing to contradict the appearance 
of the sun as being a foot across, we go along with the appearance 
and are therefore deluded by it. However, if we know that the sun is 
larger than the inhabited world, we reject the appearance and are not 
deluded by it.
33 Aristotle refers to an appearance that is used in reasoning as ‘cal-
culative appearance’ (φαντασία λογιστική, DA 3.10, 433b29), and as 
‘deliberative appearance’ (φαντασία βουλευτική, DA 3.11, 434a7). 
By these terms, he does not imply that there are rational (concep-
tual) appearances in addition to perceptual ones. What separates 
calculative and deliberative appearance from perceptual appearance 
(φαντασία αἰσθητική, DA 3.10, 433b29; 3.11, 434a5) is the way in 
which it is used in reasoning. Only animals with the capacity for rea-
soning can combine several appearances into one (e.g. an appearance 
of a horse and an appearance of a man into an appearance of a cen-
taur), and associate an appearance with a thought, say, the concept 
of centaur. This explains how the appearance used in reasoning can 
be informed by concepts. Hence, I agree with Wedin (1988, p. 145), 
who observes that ‘the difference between man and the other animals 
lies less in the distinction between two types of imagination than in 
the former’s capacity for logos’. Cf. Modrak (2001, p. 258); Corcilius 
(2014, p. 85).
34 In a practical context, the standard is something like ‘good’ or 
‘desirable’. Even if Aristotle limits his discussion on calculative and 
deliberative appearance to practical contexts, such as deliberating on 
whether a certain fig is more desirable than another one (in a con-
text in which one wishes to choose the more desirable one), there is 
no reason why he could not extend his discussion to theoretical con-
texts such as studying whether the world is eternal. At this point, I 
am following Corcilius (2014, p. 85). What is common to the two 
cases, the practical and the theoretical, is that we consider, or ‘meas-
ure’ (μετρεῖν) a given object or several objects by a single standard 
(ἑνί, 434a8–9). That implies, Aristotle adds, having in mind the prac-
tical case, that we have the capacity to combine several appearances 
into one (434a9–10). In the practical case regarding figs, we bring the 
two figs in question into comparison, which requires that we com-
bine the two appearances that we have regarding those figs into one. 
In the theoretical case, by contrast, the unification of appearances 
takes place at an earlier stage of study when we form the notion of 
the world based on experience (ἐμπειρία), which derives from several 
appearances that are stored in the memory. For the details on concept 
acquisition, see Metaph. A.1; APo 2.19.
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frightening, we are immediately affected. Aristotle makes 
this distinction clear in DA 3.3, where he notes that appear-
ance, in the case of human beings, is up to us (427b17–24). 
He thus acknowledges that we can associate and dissociate 
things in whatever ways we like. Belief, by contrast, is not 
up to us in the suggested way. That is, as seen above, because 
belief requires conviction. It can be concluded, then, that the 
considerations Aristotle puts forward in the DA crucially 
supplement and qualify those given in the De interpreta-
tione. That is why I think it is fair to judge that the implica-
tions of Aristotle’s predication theory of assertion are not as 
devastating as the critics believe.
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